Pendulum Swing in Poland-Ukraine Relations? Assessing Possible Changes in Poland’s Ukraine Policy under Karol Nawrocki.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Karol Nawrocki’s presidency introduces sharper conditions to Poland’s support of Ukraine and the overall cooperation between the two countries. While the President’s legal powers are constititutionally constrained, his veto power to forestall legislative measures, coupled with his ability to change public opinion, will have significant impact on Poland-Ukraine relations. Specific near-term policy implications include: (1) likely restrictions on social benefits for Ukrainians, (2) pressure for historical reconciliation on Volhynia, (3) tougher terms on economic reciprocity and Polish firms’ protection, and (4) potential vetoes or delays on Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO.
INTRODUCTION
Poland’s presidential election of 2025 brought Karol Nawrocki – a historian and nationalist backed by the Law and Justice (PiS) party – to the presidency. As president-elect and now president, Nawrocki has maintained that Poland will continue supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, but with new conditions and emphasis.
During his campaign, Nawrocki ran on an openly populist promise to curtail public benefits for Ukrainians in Poland and put Polish citizens first – the first results of which have already started to appear following a recent incident in Warsaw[1]. In May, Nawrocki also signed a written pledge “to reject any legislation ratifying Ukraine’s membership in NATO”. Given that almost any significant legal act on Poland-Ukraine cooperation now requires Nawrocki’s official approval, assessing the implications of such narratives is key to identifying potential shifts in Poland’s Ukraine policy. This brief attempts to forecast such shifts by analysing Poland’s legislation on presidential power, conducting a brief sentiment analysis of public statements, and interviewing a government relations field expert.
FINDINGS
- Nawrocki’s ability to radically change Poland’s policy toward supporting Ukraine is limited by law and linked to political context.
Poland’s President is the head of state, but the Constitution explicitly requires the president to “cooperate with the Prime Minister and appropriate minister” in making foreign policy. While the President does formally appoint the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, such appointments are bound by the parliamentary process. The President designates the Prime Minister (in practice, a politician supported by the majority party in the Parliament), who then proposes the Council of Ministers (cabinet). Donald Tusk, the current Prime Minister, comes from the Civic Platform – a rival political party whose presidential candidate lost his seat to Nawrocki in June 2025. While the President can initiate legislative processes and call referenda, it is highly unlikely that such measures would receive approval from the current Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
However, Nawrocki can still veto legislation if the Parliament passes any laws related to supporting Ukraine that he disagrees with. Notably, treaties such as a potential Ukraine EU accession would still require Nawrocki’s ratification. During his campaign, Nawrocki declared he “does not see Ukraine in any [Western] structure – neither in the European Union, nor in NATO” until certain conditions are met. He argued that “a state that is not able to settle accounts for crimes cannot be part of alliances.” Nawrocki’s spokesperson later stressed that the President is “the voice of a nation that demands a change in Ukraine’s approach to important and so far unresolved historical issues”, referencing the WWII-era massacres in Volhynia, an issue he insists must be resolved before Poland backs Ukraine’s EU or NATO accession. Even though the Presidential veto can be overrun by a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, our expert points out that the PiS victory in Poland’s 2027 parliamentary elections is not a remote scenario. The current ruling coalition, spearheaded by the Civic Platform, is remarkably fragile and divided on issues such as abortion rights and Poland’s grain imports from Ukraine. Nawrocki’s ability to radically change Poland’s Ukraine policy thus directly depends on the outcome of the future elections.
- Nationalist sentiment and Nawrocki’s “Poles First” policy may curtail economic and humanitarian cooperation.
In an April 2025 speech, Nawrocki announced that “this will be the most important legal change in recent years.” “In queues to doctors and clinics, Polish citizens must have priority. In schools and kindergartens – Polish children. We must introduce no subsidies to Ukrainian (and other) pensions, and social benefits will be primarily for Poles.” On August 12, Nawrocki suggested a potential curtailing of Poland’s “800+” social welfare payments programme, for Ukrainians. This echoed the public opinion on the issue – a recent survey suggested that more than half of Poles would support this measure.
Nawrocki is still citing “unfair competition” faced by Polish farmers due to Ukrainian grain as an example of Ukraine’s “indecent” behavior toward Poland. Attitudes toward the Ukrainian refugees had “cooled” also, with 75% of Poles in opposing accepting more migrants in a February 2025 survey. Given that the curtailing measure was initially proposed by the Polish People’s Party (PSL) – a member of the current ruling coalition – economic and social assistance to Ukraine will likely decrease in the coming years. Nawrocki lalso labelled Ukraine’s recent treatment of Polish economic interests “indecent”: “Our support and strategic interest does not give us the possibility to allow ourselves to be treated by the Ukrainian state the way it has treated us lately. That is indecent and it must be said clearly.”
Still, despite Nawrocki’s “Poles-first” rhetoric, the net +2.7% of GDP contribution[2] from Ukrainians is a stabiliser; though social-benefit access tightens at the margin. Considering Poland’s consistently high inflation and weakening demographics, our expert suggests that any radical measure to curtail support to Ukrainians residing in Poland may have an unpredictable effect on the country’s economy. Similarly, bilateral trade keeps rising from the 2024 base (PLN 56bn / $14.2bn exports), led by machinery, fuels, consumer goods, transport services; Poland retains a structural surplus as Ukraine’s import demand for EU goods persists – 5.8bn[3]. Any trade restriction lobbied by Nawrocki or PiS might hurt Polish businesses exporting to Ukraine.
- Security cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is likely to continue as it is.
The President supports the continued presence of US/NATO troops on Polish soil and the strengthening of Poland’s defence. However, Nawrocki’s more nationalist outlook could affect initiatives like Poland’s involvement in EU defence projects or coordinated sanctions – he is likely to support them only if they clearly align with Polish interests. Notably, Nawrocki has not questioned sanctions on Russia or Western unity against Russia, and he praises the Polish public’s support for Ukraine’s cause. Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party, repeated Nawrocki’s messaging in May 2025, saying that “We were engaged in arming the Ukrainian army… there were grounds to obtain some reciprocity, but that reciprocity is not there now.”
However, should the tensions over the Volhynia or social welfare policies continue, the President could attempt to call a national referendum on a question related to Ukraine policy, including Poland’s arms exports. However, it could backfire or be seen as a political stunt, but Nawrocki may still exercise his veto power, our expert notes. The Law and Justice party’s 2025 statements amplify this paradigm. As Nawrocki put it, “we have the right to demand the implementation of a Polish agenda in Ukraine.”
SPECIFIC POLICY FORECASTS
Poland’s tone towards Kyiv is no longer unconditional praise but “tough love”, our expert suggests. During Nawrocki’s tenure, the country’s cooperation with Ukraine will remain steady, but tied to outspoken expectations. In practical policy terms, Nawrocki might push for accelerated efforts on historical reconciliation measures (grave exhumations in Volhynia and official apologies by Ukraine), legal frameworks to limit long-term refugee benefits, and bilateral agreements on trade to protect Polish firms.
- The President’s office is likely to increase its demands in concessions from Ukraine over historical tensions.
Nawrocki may initiate or back laws that facilitate the search for the victims of the Volhynia massacre. An executive agreement or treaty with Ukraine focused on exhumations specifically, is likely to be enacted. Nawrocki’s office may consider drafting a bilateral accord to remove Ukraine’s 2017 moratorium and guarantee Polish and Ukrainian scholars joint excavation. Enacting such an agreement could unlock a more cordial phase in Poland-Ukraine relations.
- Nawrocki is likely to steer Poland’s public opinion away from supporting the Ukrainian refugees to win appeal for potential austerity measures.
Using the bully pulpit, Nawrocki can sway public opinion by constantly raising contentious issues. His nationalist stance already resonates with a large segment of Poles; by voicing concerns about the current social welfare programmes to support Ukrainians in Poland, Nawrocki could increase issue salience, which would force the ruling coalition to introduce austerity measures to win electoral support before the upcoming elections.
- Further steps towards Ukraine’s European and NATO integration are likely to be obstructed should the tensions persist.
Should Ukraine succeed in its path of accession into the European Union or NATO, Nawrocki may refuse to sign it into action, should the agreement over the issues impacting the Poland-Ukraine cooperation remain unresolved. Given that President Nawrocki is strongly aligned with the US President Trump – this could stall Ukraine’s accession into NATO and delay Ukraine’s entry into the EU. If the PiS gains majority in Poland’s next parliamentary elections – this scenario is even more likely to succeed.
- Poland’s economic initiatives towards Ukraine will prioritise reciprocity and foreign direct investment.
Nawrocki is very likely to strike a firmer tone in trade and and economic competition. He argues Polish firms must be protected if cheaper Ukrainian goods “disrupt” markets. Given that the “historical” conditionality over the Volhynia issue is harder to measure–and justify–to Poland’s business community, Nawrocki may push for an extensive partnership treaty between Poland and Ukraine that would set a roadmap for cooperation on his terms. This could take shape as a high-level treaty or set of agreements in areas like defense industry (joint arms production), agriculture, and energy but with built-in conditionalities. For instance, a treaty clause might stipulate Polish support for Ukraine’s NATO aspirations only after certain privileges are allotted to Polish companies investing in Ukraine.
[1] Following the incident at a public event on August 9, 2025–just days into Nawrocki’s term–when some attendees (including Ukrainians) fought security and one waved a red-and-black flag, falsely presumed to originate from the Ukrainian nationalist movements during the Second World War, tensions have risen. Polish authorities arrested over 100 people and moved to deport 57 Ukrainians, followed by Nawrocki’s calls to outlaw any demonstration of “Bandera symbols” (sic) in Poland.
[2] According to the UNHCR.
[3] According to Eurostat data from Q1 2025.
