NATO’s Final Warning? Identifying the Implications of September 2025 Drone Incursion into Poland.
On the night of September 9, 2025, at least 19 allegedly Russian combat drones entered the Polish airspace in what was later described as an “unprecedented act of aggression” against NATO and the first time the Allied aircraft were scrambled to destroy Russian assets over NATO’s territory. While the drones used were mostly low-tech “Geran-2” (Iranian Shahed) types and styrofoam decoys, they penetrated deep into Poland before being intercepted by NATO fighter jets. Some debris fell near critical infrastructure (one crash site was not far from the Rzeszów-Jasionka airport – a major NATO supply hub for Ukraine). This suggests that even a NATO member-state armed with sophisticated PATRIOT air defence systems and fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets is not immune to cheaper, asymmetric warfare. Given that Russia has repeatedly violated NATO’s airspace (including, most recently, in Estonia on September 19, 2025), what are some other potential vulnerabilities of NATO’s eastern flank against asymmetric provocations, and how effective have the countermeasures been?
A damaged house in the eastern Polish town of Wyryki. Foto: Jakub Orzechowski / Agencja Wyborcza / REUTERS
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS OF THE INCIDENT
Coordinated military response
Following the incident, Poland has invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and summoned a United Nations Security Council meeting. Nevertheless, a more effective gesture of coordinated support is the activation of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD). Allied forces scrambled alongside Poland’s jets in a coordinated operation to secure the skies. Dutch F-35 fighters (deployed in Poland since early September) engaged and reportedly shot down the majority of the drones that were destroyed. Polish F-16s and Italian Air Force AWACS surveillance aircraft also took part, and a Belgian air-to-air refueling tanker supported the mission. German Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries stationed in Poland were put on high alert and tracked the drone swarm’s flight path. This trail of developments suggests that an incursion scenario was well-rehearsed before the incident, and that the Alliance has finally gained enough political will to respond to such maneuvers.
Deterrence
By 13–14 September, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry, a concerted deployment of additional Allied forces to Poland and the Baltic in response to the drone provocation. Secretary General Rutte and SACEUR Gen. Alexus Grynkewich announced the measures on 12 Sept, describing Eastern Sentry as an effort to “enhance NATO’s deterrence and defensive posture” on the eastern flank, especially air. Under this plan, France is sending three Rafale fighter jets to Poland, Germany is deploying four Eurofighter Typhoons, and Denmark is contributing two F-16s plus a frigate for air defense in the Baltic Sea. The Netherlands accelerated the delivery of a Patriot SAM battery to Poland that it had previously and the Czech Republic dispatched a military helicopter unit to assist. At least eight NATO member states immediately pledged forces for Eastern Sentry, and Poland’s President, Nawrocki, has approved the temporary stationing of foreign troops in Poland. Once implemented, these forces will complement the existing NATO personnel stationed in Poland, including around 10,000 American troops. Should Russia attempt another asymmetric attack on Poland, such measures may ensure an even greater coordination among the Allies, as well as a greater risk perception by Russia.
Costs
No Polish official has published an exact “per-interception” cost, and official reports suggest only that very expensive missiles were used and that saving lives justifies the expense. However, published data allow rough estimates: as of 2025 the Polish Ministry of Defence reports that one hour of a Polish F-16 flight costs ~76,859 PLN (about $17–18k). Thus, a typical scramble sortie (e.g., 1–2 hours) runs on the order of 100–150k PLN per jet. Each AIM-120 AMRAAM missile (commonly used by the F-16) costs about $2–2.5 million. Hence, one F-16 intercept firing a single AMRAAM could consume several million zł. Polish generals nonetheless point out that “palec pilotowi nie drgnie” – the pilot wouldn’t hesitate to fire even a ~$100 million missile to stop a threat to life.
This is a dangerous, if not careless, position to take. Russia is paying $350,000 per target struck by a single unit of its Shahed (Geran) drone. At the same time, Russia’s decoy Gerbera drones cost around $10,000 per unit. Both drones can be directed off-course through jamming, and Ukrainians have utilised it to protect their skies. This makes drone incursions into NATO territory extremely costly from both a financial and political perspective. Producing decoy and combat drones is relatively cheap for Russia, while Poland will be under a financial strain should it continually use expensive munitions to down them. Politically, Russia can always resort to plausible deniability, insisting that any potential drone incursion is the result of Ukraine’s electronic warfare and that any NATO countermeasures are an act of escalation. Given this, it is worth examining the state of Poland–and NATO’s–capacity to respond to such threats in the future using symmetric, cheaper means.
POLAND’S READINESS FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Threat detection and agility weak points
The incident has exposed Poland’s vulnerability to low-attitude drone incursions. In peacetime, Poland’s national radar network “does not provide continuous coverage below 3 km”. A planned modernisation of the country’s anti-drone system “SkyCTRL” had been stalled for 18 months due to funding issues, leaving it effectively inactive. There is also no dedicated layered anti-UAV systems (neither enough jammers nor directed-energy and gun systems) due to budget constraints and bureaucratic hurdles. Even though Poland’s defence spending hit record levels (~3.8–4.7% GDP in 2024–25), much of the new funding is already tied up. External analysis shows that existing multi‐year contracts (over 500 bn PLN) consume nearly all planned modernisation budgets through 2028. Despite nominal increases in defence spending, few funds are allocated toward modernisation, which may include cheaper jamming and drone interception tools. The European Commission places Poland under the excessive deficit procedure, which limits the possibility of financing defence modernisation from repayable funds. As a result, any additional procurement, including that for anti-UAV systems, will face difficulties.
The “war fatigue” and political polarisation
As noted by Marek Magierowski, Poland’s former Ambassador to the United States, for Poland, war is “no longer next door”. The normally polarised Polish political scene displayed rare unity in the face of the attack. Prime Minister Tusk (of the centrist Civic Platform) and President Karol Nawrocki (a conservative nationalist) “praised each other for the excellent cooperation” during the crisis. Both emphasised vigilance against Russian disinformation attempts – such as false claims that the incident was a Ukrainian “false flag” – and those narratives did not gain traction domestically. Nevertheless, the sheer costs of the operation and Poland’s polarisation toward greater involvement in Ukraine may influence the implementation of defence modernisation initiatives. In a July 2025 survey, 60% of Poles opposed the idea of intercepting Russian drones or missiles over Ukrainian territory. Given the implementation constraints, Russia’s drone incursions into Poland are likely to cost even more in the long run. The resulting budget reallocations from social spending to defence may cause a stir among the public, potentially reducing Poland’s willingness to engage in the war.
OTHER COUNTERMEASURES AND FUTURE FORECAST
NATO’s existing countermeasures have not prevented Russia from further aerial incursions against the Alliance in Estonia. Beyond rhetoric and eastward Allied troop deployment within the Operation Eastern Sentry, Poland itself has taken measures to mitigate the modernisation bottlenecks. On September 12, 2025, Poland’s Secretary of State at the Ministry of National Defence, Cezary Tomczyk, authorised Decision No. 123/MON, which establishes a streamlined process for testing and approving unmanned systems. Under the Special Act on strategic defence investments, effective since 6 September, the rules allow the Polish Armed Forces to bypass standard public procurement procedures once systems have been field-tested and approved. Viewed together with Lithuania’s legislative updates that allow immediate elimination of drones violating its airspace, the Ministry’s decision is a tangible step toward further deterrence.
